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Abstract—As an emerging decentralized secure data manage-
ment platform, blockchain has gained much popularity recently.
To maintain a canonical state of blockchain data record, proof-of-
work based consensus protocols provide the nodes, referred to as
miners, in the network with incentives for confirming new block
of transactions through a process of “block mining” by solving
a cryptographic puzzle. Under the circumstance of limited local
computing resources, e.g., mobile devices, it is natural for rational
miners, i.e., consensus nodes, to offload computational tasks for
proof of work to the cloud/fog computing servers. Therefore, we
focus on the trading between the cloud/fog computing service
provider and miners, and propose an auction-based market
model for efficient computing resource allocation. In particular,
we consider a proof-of-work based blockchain network, which
is constrained by the computing resource and deployed as an
infrastructure for decentralized data management applications.
Due to the competition among miners in the blockchain network,
the allocative externalities are particularly taken into account
when designing the auction mechanisms. Specifically, we consider
two bidding schemes: the constant-demand scheme where each
miner bids for a fixed quantity of resources, and the multi-
demand scheme where the miners can submit their preferable
demands and bids. For the constant-demand bidding scheme,
we propose an auction mechanism that achieves optimal social
welfare. In the multi-demand bidding scheme, the social welfare
maximization problem is NP-hard. Therefore, we design an ap-
proximate algorithm which guarantees the truthfulness, individ-
ual rationality and computational efficiency. Through extensive
simulations, we show that our proposed auction mechanisms
with the two bidding schemes can efficiently maximize the social
welfare of the blockchain network and provide effective strategies
for the cloud/fog computing service provider.
Index Terms—Blockchain, auction, cloud/fog computing, social
welfare, pricing, proof of work, game theory
I. INTRODUCTION
B
Y contrast to traditional currencies, cryptocurrencies are
traded among participants over a peer-to-peer (P2P) net-
work without relying on third parties such as banks or financial
regulatory authorities [1]. As the backbone technology of
decentralized cryptocurrencies, blockchain has also heralded
many applications in various fields, such as finance [2],
Internet of Things (IoT) [3] and resource offloading [4].
According to the market research firm Tractica’s report, it is
estimated that the annual revenue for enterprise applications
of blockchain will increase to $19.9 billion by 2025 [5].
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Essentially, blockchain is a tamperproof, distributed database
that records transactional data in a P2P network. The database
state is decentrally maintained, and any member node in
the overlay blockchain network is permitted to participate
in the state maintenance without identity authentication. The
transactions among member nodes are recorded in crypto-
graphic hash-linked data structures known as blocks. A series
of confirmed blocks are arranged in chronological order to
form a sequential chain, hence named blockchain. All member
nodes in the network are required to follow the Nakamoto
consensus protocol [1] (or other protocols alike), to agree
on the transactional data, cryptographic hashes and digital
signatures stored in the block to guarantee the integrity of
the blockchain.
The Nakamoto consensus protocol integrates a critical
computing-intensive process, called Proof-of-Work (PoW). In
order to have their local views of the blockchain accepted by
the network as the canonical state of the blockchain, consensus
nodes (i.e., block miners) have to solve a cryptographic puzzle,
i.e., find a nonce to be contained in the block such that
the hash value of the entire block is smaller than a preset
target. This computational process is called mining, where
the consensus nodes which contribute their computing power
to mining are known as miners. Typically, the mining task
for PoW can be regarded as a tournament [6]. First, each
miner collects and verifies a certain number of unconfirmed
transaction records which are aggregated into a new block.
Next, all miners chase each other to be the first one to obtain
the desired nonce value as the PoW solutions for the new block
which combines the collected transactional data1 and block
metadata. Once the PoW puzzle is solved, this new block will
be immediately broadcasted to the entire blockchain network.
Meanwhile, the other miners receive this message and perform
a chain validation-comparison process to decide whether to
approve and add newly generated block to the blockchain.
The miner which successfully has its proposed block linked
to the blockchain will be given a certain amount of reward,
including a fixed bonus and a variable transaction fee, as an
incentive of mining.
Since no prior authorization is required, the permissionless
blockchain is especially suitable for serving as a platform for
decentralized autonomous data management in many appli-
cations. Some representative examples can be found in data
sharing [7], electricity trading in smart grid [8] and personal
1 We refer to all transaction records stored in the block simply as transactional
data in the rest of the paper.
2data access control [9]. Apart from the feature of public access,
permissionless blockchains have the advantage in quickly
establishing a self-organized data management platform to
support various decentralized applications (DApps). This is a
breakthrough in production relations in that people can inde-
pendently design smart contracts and freely build decentralized
applications themselves without the support or permission
from trusted intermediaries. By the PoW-based Nakamoto con-
sensus protocol, people are encouraged to become consensus
nodes, i.e., miners, with the mining reward. Unfortunately,
solving the PoW puzzle needs continuous, high computing
power which mobile devices and IoT devices cannot afford.
As the number of mobile phone users is forecasted to reach
nearly 5 billion2 in 2019, it is expected that DApps would
usher in explosive growth if mobile devices can join in the
mining and consensus process and self-organize a blockchain
network to support DApps [10]. To alleviate the computational
bottleneck, the consensus nodes can access the cloud/fog
computing service to offload their mining tasks, thus enabling
blockchain-based DApps. As the cloud/fog computing service
can breed more consensus nodes to be able to execute the
mining task, it would significantly improve the robustness of
the blockchain network and then raise the valuation of DApps,
which further attracts more DApp users to join, forming a
virtuous circle.
In this paper, we mainly investigate the trading between
the cloud/fog computing service provider (CFP) and the
computationally lightweight devices, i.e., miners. From the
system perspective, we aim to maximize the social welfare
which is the total utility of the CFP and all miners in the
blockchain network. The social welfare can be interpreted
as the system efficiency [11]. For an efficient and sustain-
able business ecosystem, there are some critical issues about
cloud/fog resources allocation and pricing for the service
provider. First, which miner can be offered the computing
resources? Too many miners will cause service congestion
and incur high operation cost to the service provider. By
contrast, a very small group of miners may erode the integrity
of the blockchain network. Second, how to set a reasonable
service price for miners such that they can be incentivized to
undertake the mining tasks? The efficient method is to set up
an auction where the miners can actively submit their bids to
the CFP for decision making. We should also consider how
to make miners truthfully expose their private valuation. A
miner’s valuation on the computing service is directly related
to its privately collected transactional data which determines
its expected reward from the blockchain. To address the above
questions, we propose an auction-based cloud/fog computing
resource market model for blockchain networks. Moreover, we
design truthful auction mechanisms for two different bidding
schemes. One is the constant-demand scheme where the CFP
restricts that each miner can bid only for the same quantity
of computing resources. The other one is the multi-demand
scheme where miners can request their demands and express
the corresponding bids more freely. The major contributions
of this paper can be summarized as follows:
2 https://www.statista.com/statistics/274774/forecast-of-mobile-
phone-users-worldwide
• In the auction-based cloud/fog computing resources mar-
ket, we take the competition among miners [12] and
network effects of blockchain by nature [13] into consid-
eration. We study the auction mechanism with allocative
externalities3 to maximize the social welfare.
• From the perspective of the CFP, we formulate social
welfare maximization problems for two bidding schemes:
constant-demand scheme and multi-demand scheme. For
the constant-demand bidding scheme, we develop an
optimal algorithm that achieves optimal social welfare.
For the multi-demand bidding scheme, we prove that
the formulated problem is NP-hard and equivalent to
the problem of non-monotone submodular maximization
with knapsack constraints. Therefore, we introduce an
approximate algorithm that generates sub-optimal social
welfare. Both the algorithms are designed to be truthful,
individually rational and computationally efficient.
• Based on the real-world mobile blockchain experiment,
we define and verify two characteristic functions for sys-
tem model formulation. One is the hash power function
that describes the relationship between the probability
of successfully mining a block and the corresponding
miner’s computing power. The other one is the net-
work effects function that characterizes the relationship
between security of the blockchain network and total
computing resources invested into the network.
• Our simulation results show that the proposed auction
mechanisms not only help the CFP make practical and
efficient computing resource trading strategies, but also
offer insightful guidance to the blockchain developer in
designing the blockchain protocol.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
investigates resource management and pricing for blockchain
networks in the auction-based market. This paper is an ex-
tended version of our conference paper [14]. In[14], we
considered only the miners with constant demand and did
not perform the real-world experiment to verify the network
effects function.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews related work. The system model of cloud/fog comput-
ing resource market for blockchain networks is introduced in
Section III. Section IV discusses the constant-demand bidding
scheme and the optimal algorithm for social welfare maxi-
mization. In Section V, the approximate algorithm for multi-
demand bidding scheme is presented in detail. Experimental
results of mobile blockchain and the performance analysis of
the proposed auction mechanisms are presented in Section VI.
Finally, Section VII concludes the paper. Table I lists notations
frequently used in the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
As the core part of the blockchain network, creating blocks
integrates the distributed database (i.e., ledger), the consensus
protocol and the executable scripts (i.e., smart contract) [15].
From the perspective of data processing, a DApp is essentially
3 The allocative externalities occur when the allocation result of the auction
affects the valuation of the miners.
3Table I: Frequently used notations.
NOTATION DESCRIPTION
N , N Set of miners and the total number of miners
M Set of winners, i.e., the selected miners by the
auction
d, di Miners’ service demand profile and miner i’s
demand for cloud/fog computing resource
b, bi Miners’ bid profile and miner i’s bid for its demand
di
x, xi Resource allocation profile and allocation result for
miner i
p, pi Price profile and cloud/fog computing service price
for miner i
γi Miner i’s hash power
T , r Fixed bonus from mining a new block and the
transaction fee rate
si Miner i’s block size
λ Average block time
D Total supply of computing resources from CFP
w Network effects function
q Quantity of computing resource required by
constant-demand miner
β Demand constraint ratio for multi-demand miner
developed on the basis of smart contracts and transactional
data stored in the blockchain. DApps usually use the dis-
tributed ledger to monitor the state/ownership changes of
the tokenized assets. The implementation of smart contracts
are driven by the transaction/data change to autonomously
determine the blockchain state transition, e.g., the asset re-
distribution among the DApp users [3], [15]. With the public
blockchain, DApps do not have to rely on a centralized infras-
tructure and intermediary that supports ledger maintenance and
smart contracts execution with dedicated storage and comput-
ing resources. Instead, DApp providers adopt the token-based
reward mechanisms which incentivize people to undertake
the tasks of resource provision and system maintenance. In
this way, the functionalities of DApps can be freely activated
and realized among transaction issuing/validation, information
propagation/storage and consensus participation [15], [16].
Therefore, the public blockchain network is a suitable plat-
form for incentive-driven Distributed Autonomous Organiza-
tion (DAO) systems. To date, a line of literature study the
DAO in wireless networking based on the public blockchain.
The authors in [4] established a trading platform for Device-
to-Device (D2D) computation offloading based on a dedicated
cryptocurrency network. They introduced smart contract-based
auctions between neighbor D2D nodes to execute resource
offloading and offload the block mining tasks to the cloudlets.
The authors in [17] adopted a PoW-based public blockchain as
the backbone of a P2P file storage market, where the privacy of
different parties in a transaction is enhanced by the techniques
such as ring signatures and one-time payment addresses. When
identity verification is required for market access granting,
e.g., in the scenarios of autonomous network slice broker-
ing [18] and P2P electricity trading [8], the public blockchain
can be adapted into consortium blockchain by introducing
membership authorizing servers with little modification to the
consensus protocols and the smart contract design.
Recently, there have already been some studies on the
blockchain network from the point of game theory. The authors
in [19] proposed a game-theoretic model where the occurrence
of working out the PoW puzzle was modeled as a Poisson
process. Since a miner’s expected reward largely depends on
the block size, each miner’s response is to choose a reasonable
block size before mining for its optimal expected reward.
An analytical Nash equilibrium in a two-player case was
discussed. In [20], the authors presented a cooperative game
model to investigate the mining pool. In the pool, miners
form a coalition to accumulate their computing power for
steady rewards. Nevertheless, these works mainly focused on
the block mining strategies and paid little attention to the
deployment of the blockchain network for developing DApps
and corresponding resource allocation problems. As a branch
of the game theory, the auction mechanism has been widely
used to deal with resource allocation issues in various areas,
such as mobile crowdsensing [21], [22], [23], cloud/edge
computing [24], [25], and spectrum trading [26]. In [23], the
authors proposed incentive mechanisms for efficient mobile
task crowdsourcing based on reverse combinatorial auctions.
They considered data quality constraints in a linear social
welfare maximization problem. The authors in [24] designed
optimal and approximate strategy-proof mechanisms to solve
the problem of physical machine resource management in
clouds. They formulated the problem as a linear integer
program. In [25], the authors proposed an auction-based profit
maximization model for hierarchical mobile edge comput-
ing. Unfortunately, it did not take any economic properties,
e.g., incentive compatibility, into account. While guaranteeing
the strategyproofness, the authors in [26] investigated the
problem of redistributing wireless channels and focused on
the social welfare maximization. They not only considered
strategyproofness, but also took the channel spatial reusability,
channel heterogeneity and bid diversity into account. However,
in their combinatorial auction setting, the bidder’s requested
spectrum bundle is assumed to be always truthful. In fact,
none of these works can be directly applied to allocating
computing resources for the blockchain mainly due to its
unique architecture. In the blockchain network, the allocative
externalities [27], [28] should be particularly taken into con-
sideration. For example, besides its own received computing
resources, each miner also cares much about the other miners’
computing power.
In our paper, the social welfare optimization in the multi-
demand bidding scheme is proved to be a problem of
non-monotone submodular maximization with knapsack con-
straints, which has not been well studied in auction mechanism
design to date. The most closely related papers are [22]
and [29] in mobile crowdsourcing. In [22], the authors pre-
sented a representative truthful auction mechanism for crowd-
sourcing tasks. They studied a non-monotone submodular
maximization problem without constraints. In [29], the authors
formulated a monotone sub-modular function maximization
problem when designing a truthful auction mechanism. The
total payment to the mobile users is constrained by a fixed
budget. Technically, the algorithms in aforementioned works
cannot be applied in our models. In addition, the authors
in [30] used deep learning to recover the classical optimal
auction for revenue maximization and applied it in the edge
4computing resources allocation in mobile blockchain. How-
ever, it only considers one unit of resource in the auction.
III. SYSTEM MODEL: BLOCKCHAIN MINING AND
AUCTION BASED MARKET MODEL
A. Cloud/Fog Computing Resource Trading
Our system model is built under the assumptions that 1) the
public blockchain network adopts the classical PoW consensus
protocol [1], 2) miners do not use their own devices, e.g.,
computationally lightweight or mobile devices, to execute
the mining tasks. We consider a scenario where there is
one CFP and a community of miners N ={1, . . . , N}. Each
miner runs a blockchain-based DApps to record and verify
the transactional data sent to the blockchain network. Due to
insufficient energy and computing capacity of their devices, the
miners offload the task of solving PoW to nearby cloud/fog
computing service which is deployed and maintained by the
CFP. To perform the trading, the CFP launches an auction. The
CFP first announces auction rules and the available service
to miners. Then, the miners submit their resource demand
profile d = (d1, . . . , dN ) and corresponding bid profile
b = (b1, . . . , bN) which represents the valuations of their
requested resources. After having received miners’ demands
and bids, the CFP selects the winning miners and notifies
all miners the allocation x = (x1, . . . , xN ) and the service
price p = (p1, . . . , pN ), i.e., the payment for each miner
4. We
assume that miners are single minded [31], that is, each miner
only accepts its requested quantity of resources or none. The
setting xi = 1 means that miner i is within the winner list and
allocated resources for which it submits the bid, while xi = 0
means no resource allocated. The payment for a miner which
fails the auction is set to be zero, i.e., pi = 0 if xi = 0. At
the end of the auction, the selected miners or winners make
the payment according to the price assigned by the CFP and
access the cloud/fog computing service.
B. Blockchain Mining with Cloud/Fog Computing Service
With the allocation xi and demand di, miner i’s hash power
γi can be calculated from
γi(d,x) =
dixi
dN
, (1)
which is a linear fractional function. The function depends
on other miners’ allocated computing resources and satisfies∑
i∈N γi = 1. dN =
∑
i∈N dixi is the total quantity of allo-
cated resources. The hash power function γi(d,x) is verified
by a real-world experiment as presented later in Section VI.
Before executing the miner selection by the auction, each
miner has collected unconfirmed transactional data into its own
block. We denote each miner’s block size, i.e., the total size
of transactional data and metadata, by s = (s1, . . . , sN ). In
the mining tournament, the generation of new blocks follows
a Poisson process with a constant mean rate 1
λ
throughout
the whole blockchain network [32]. λ is also known as the
average block time. If the miner i finds a new block, the
4 Throughout this paper, the terms price and payment are used
interchangeably.
time for propagation and verification of transactions in the
block is dominantly affected by si. The first miner which
successfully has its block reach consensus can receive a token
reward R. The token reward is composed of a fixed bonus
T ≥ 0 for mining a new block and a variable transaction fee
ti = rsi determined by miner i’s block size si and a predefined
transaction fee rate r [19]. Thus, miner i’s token reward Ri
can be expressed as follows:
Ri = (T + rsi)Pi(γi(d,x), si), (2)
where Pi(γi(d,x), si) is the probability that miner i receives
the reward for contributing a block to the blockchain.
We note that obtaining the reward rests with successful
mining and instant propagation. Miner i’s probability of dis-
covering the nonce value Pmi is equal to its hash power γi,
i.e., Pmi = γi. However, a lucky miner may even lose the
tournament if its broadcast block is not accepted by other
miners at once, i.e., failing to reach consensus. The newly
mined block that cannot be added onto the blockchain is called
orphan block [19]. A larger block needs more propagation
and verification time, thus resulting in larger delay in reaching
consensus. As such, a larger block size means a higher chance
that the block suffers orphaned. According to the statistics
displayed in [33], miner i’s block propagation time τi is linear
to the block size, i.e., τi = ξsi. ξ is a constant that reflects the
impact of si on τi. Since the arrival rate of new blocks follows
the Poisson distribution, miner i’s orphaning probability is:
P oi = 1− e
− 1
λ
τi . (3)
Substituting τi, we can express Pi as follows:
Pi(γi(d,x), si) = P
m
i (1− P
o
i ) = γie
− 1
λ
ξsi . (4)
C. Business Ecosystem for Blockchain based DApps
Figure 1: Business ecosystem for blockchain based DApps.
Here, we describe the business ecosystem for blockchain
based DApps in Fig. 1. In developing a blockchain based
DApps, there exists a blockchain developer which is responsi-
ble for designing or adopting the blockchain operation proto-
col. The developer specifies the fixed bonus T , the transaction
fee rate r and so on. Through adjusting the difficulty of finding
the new nonce, the blockchain developer keeps the average
block time λ at a reasonable constant value. To support the
DApps, in the deployed blockchain network, miners perform
mining and token reward, i.e., R, is used to incentivize them.
5The reward may come from the token that DApps users pay
to the blockchain network.
When bidding for computing resources, miners always
evaluate the value of the tokens. In fact, the intrinsic value
of tokens depends on the trustworthiness and robustness,
i.e., the value of the blockchain network itself. From the
perspective of trustworthiness, the PoW-based blockchain is
only as secure as the amount of computing power dedicated to
mining tasks [13]. This results in positive network effects [13]
in that as more miners participate and more computing re-
sources are invested, the security of the blockchain network
is improved, and hence the value of a reward given to miners
increases. A straightforward example is that if the robustness
of the blockchain network is very low, i.e., vulnerable to
manipulation (51% attack, double-spending attack, etc.), that
means this blockchain is insecure and cannot support any
decentralized application effectively. Naturally, this blockchain
network losses its value and its distributed tokens (including
the rewards to miners) would be worthless. On the contrary,
if there are many miners and computing resources invested,
the blockchain would be more reliable and secure [34]. Thus,
users would trust it more and like to use its supported
decentralized applications through purchasing the tokens and
then miners would also gain more valuation on their received
tokens (reward). To confirm this fact, we conduct a real-world
experiment (see Section VI-A) to evaluate the value of the
tokens and the reward by examining the impact of the total
computing power on preventing double-spending attacks. By
curve fitting of the experimental data, we define the network
effects by a non-negative utility function as follows:
w(pi) = a1pi − a2pie
a3pi , (5)
where pi = dN
D
∈ [0, 1] is the normalized total computing
power of the blockchain network. dN =
∑
i∈N dixi is the
total quantity of allocated computing resources, and D is
the maximum quantity that CFP can supply. a1, a2, a3 > 0
are curve fitting parameters and this network effects function
in the feasible domain is monotonically increasing with a
diminishing return.
D. Miner’s Valuation on Cloud/Fog Computing Resources
In the auction, a miner’s bid represents the valuation of com-
puting resources for which it demands. Since miner i cannot
know the number of winning miners and the total quantity
of allocated resources until the end of auction, we assume
that miner i can only give the bid bi according to its expected
reward Ri and demand di without considering network effects
and other miners’ demands, i.e., setting w(dN ) = 1 and∑
j∈N\{i} djxj = 0. In other words, miner i has an ex-ante
valuation v′i which can be written as (P
m
i = γi = 1):
v′i = Ridi = (T + rsi) e
− 1
λ
ξsidi. (6)
Here, we assume that Ri represents the miner i’s valuation
for one unit computing resource and di is decided according
to miner i’s own available budget. Since our proposed auction
mechanisms are truthful (to be proved later), bi is equal to the
true ex-ante valuation v′i, i.e., bi = v
′
i.
After the auction is completed, miners receive the allocation
result, i.e., x, and are able to evaluate the network effects.
Hereby, miner i has an ex-post valuation v′′i as follows:
v′′i = v
′
iw(pi)γi(d,x)
=
d2ixi
dN
(a1pi − a2pie
a3pi) (T + rsi) e
− 1
λ
ξsi
=
d2ixi
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3
dN
D
)
(T + rsi) e
− 1
λ
ξsi . (7)
E. Social Welfare Maximization
The CFP selects winning miners, i.e., winners, and deter-
mines corresponding prices in order to maximize the social
welfare. Let c denote the unit cost of running the cloud/fog
computing service, so the total cost to the CFP can be ex-
pressed by C(dN ) = cdN =
∑
i∈N cdixi. Thus, we define the
social welfare of the blockchain network S as the difference
between the sum of all miners’ ex-post valuations and the
CFP’s total cost, i.e.,
S(x) =
∑
i∈N
v′′i − C(dN )
=
∑
i∈N
d2i xi
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3
dN
D
)
(T + rsi) e
− 1
λ
ξsi
−cdN . (8)
Therefore, the primary objective of designing the auction
mechanism is to solve the following integer programming:
max
x
S(x) =
∑
i∈N
(
d2i xi
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3
D
∑
i∈N dixi
)
(T + rsi) e
− 1
λ
ξsi
)
−
∑
i∈N
cdixi, (9)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
dixi ≤ D, (10)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ N , (11)
where (10) is the constraint on the quantity of computing
resources that CFP can offer. In the next two sections, we
consider two types of bidding scheme in the auction design:
constant-demand bidding scheme and multi-demand bidding
scheme. Accordingly, there are two types of miners: constant-
demand miners and multi-demand miners. We aim to maxi-
mize the social welfare, while guaranteeing the truthfulness,
individual rationality and computational efficiency.
F. Example Application: Mobile Data Crowdsourcing
As shown in Fig. 2, we take an example of mobile data
crowdsourcing to illustrate the use of our model and and to
demonstrate an effectiveness of the related concepts. Initially,
there are a group of mobile users. Each of the mobile users
can be either a worker that collects data from the sensors in its
mobile device or a requester that wants to buy the sensing data
from other users (workers). However, there is often no trusted
or authorized crowdsourcing platform to process the data
trading and record the transactions. Moreover, no mobile user
has enough trust, right, or capability to establish and operate
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Figure 2: An example mobile data crowdsourcing application illustrating the system model and the cloud/fog computing
resource market for blockchain networks.
such a centralized platform. In this case, a viable solution is
to design and deploy a blockchain based crowdsourcing DApp
by a blockchain developer. Based on the designed protocol,
the mobile users can utilize the available cloud/fog computing
resources to self-organize a reliable blockchain network. Thus,
their data trading activities can be facilitated by the established
decentralized crowdsourcing platform with smart contracts.
The blockchain developer adopts the PoW protocol and sets
the parameters, such as the fixed reward T , the transaction fee
rate r and the average block time λ. Due to limited energy
and computational capability, mobile users (miners) need to
buy computing resources from the CFP through an auction
process and then join the miner network. Before the auction
begins, miner i may possess a certain amount of data to be
stored in the blockchain and knows its block size si. According
to (6), the miner i will evaluate its expected reward and the
ex-ante value v′i of the computing resources based on the
protocol parameters, its block size and demand. Next, the
miner i submits the bid bi and the demand di to the CFP.
Using our proposed auction algorithm, the CFP can select
the winning miners, i.e., the allocation xi, and determine
the price pi to maximize the social welfare. Meanwhile, it
can guarantee the miner’s truthfulness and non-negative utility
which is the difference between the ex-post valuation v′′i and
its payment pi. Once the auction ends, the winning miners
which are allocated the computing resources form a miner
network. With the CFP service in solving the PoW puzzle and
calculating the hash values, the winning miners can start the
mining and consensus process to verify and contribute new
blocks containing the crowdsourced data and corresponding
transaction records to the blockchain. For more details about
the blockchain-based crowdsourcing, please refer to [35].
IV. AUCTION-BASED MECHANISM FOR
CONSTANT-DEMAND MINERS
In this section, we first consider a simple case where
all miners submit bids for the same quantity of computing
resources. Here, each miner’s demand is q units, i.e., di =
q ∈ (0, D), ∀i ∈ N . Thus, the optimization problem for the
CFP can be expressed as follows:
max
x
S(x) =
∑
i∈N
(
q2xi
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3
D
∑
i∈N qxi
)
(T + rsi) e
− 1
λ
ξsi
)
−
∑
i∈N
cqxi, (12)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
qxi ≤ D, (13)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ N . (14)
The first proposed truthful auction for Constant-Demand
miners in Blockchain networks (CDB auction), as presented
in Algorithm 1, is an optimal one and its rationale is based
on the well-known Myerson’s characterization [36] provided
in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. ([31, Theorem 13.6]) An auction mechanism is
truthful if and only if it satisfies the following two properties:
1) Monotonicity: If miner i wins the auction with bid bi,
then it will also win with any higher bid b′i > bi.
2) Critical payment: The payment by a winner is the
smallest value needed in order to win the auction.
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, the CDB auction consists of
two consecutive processes: winner selection (lines 5-16) and
service price calculation (lines 17-31). The winner selection
process is implemented with a greedy method. For the con-
venience of later discussion, we define a set of winners as
M. Adding a miner i in M means setting xi = 1. Thus, we
7Algorithm 1 CDB auction
Input: Miners’ bid profile b and demand profile d.
Output: Resource allocation x and service price p.
1: begin
2: for each i ∈ N do
3: xi ← 0, pi ← 0
4: end for
5: Sort bids b in descending order.
6: j ← argmaxj∈N bj
7: M← {j}, S ← q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3q
D
)
bj − cq
8: while M 6= N and |M| ≤ D do
9: j ← argmaxj∈N\Mbj
10: Mt ←M∪ {j}
11: St ←
∑
i∈Mt
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3q|Mt|
)
bi − cq |Mt|
12: if St < S or St < 0 then
13: break
14: end if
15: M←M∪ {j}
16: end while
17: for each i ∈ M do
18: xi ← 1, N−i ← N \ {i}, M−i ←M\ {i}
19: j ← argmaxj∈N−i bj
20: M′ ← {j}, S′ ← q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3q|M′|
D
)
bj − cq
21: while M′ 6= N and
∣∣M′∣∣ ≤ D do
22: j ← arg maxi∈N−i\M′bj
23: M′t ←M
′ ∪ {j}
24: S′t ←
∑
i∈M′t
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3q|M′t|
D
)
bi − cq
∣∣M′t∣∣
25: if S′t < S
′ or S′t < 0 then
26: break
27: end if
28: M′ ←M′t , S
′ ← S′t
29: end while
30: pi = S
′ −
∑
i∈M−i
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3q|M−i|
D
)
bi − cq |M−i|
31: end for
32: end
transform the original problem in (12)-(14) to an equivalent
set function form as follows:
max
M⊆N
S(M) =
∑
i∈M
(
a1 − a2e
a3q|M|
D
) qbi
D
− cq |M| ,
(15)
s.t. q|M| ≤ D, (16)
where |M| represents the cardinality of set M which is the
number of winners in M and bi = v
′
i = (T + rsi) e
− 1
λ
ξsiq.
In the winner selection process (lines 5-11), miners are first
sorted in a descending order according to their bids. Then,
they are sequentially added to the set of winners M until the
social welfare S(M) begins to decrease. Finally, the set of
winners M and the allocation x are output by the algorithm.
Proposition 1. The resource allocation x output by Algo-
rithm 1 is globally optimal to the social welfare maximization
problem given in (12)-(14).
Proof: With the proof by contradiction, this result follows
from Claim 1.
Claim 1. Let MA be the solution output by Algorithm 1 on
input b, andMO be the optimal solution. IfMA 6=MO, then
we can construct another solution M∗O whose social welfare
S(M∗O) is even larger than the optimal social welfare S(MO).
Proof:We assume b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bN andMA 6=MO. Next,
we consider two cases.
1) Case 1: MO ⊂ MA. According to Algorithm 1, it is
obvious that we can construct a solution M∗O with higher
social welfare by adding a member from MA to MO.
2) Case 2: MO 6⊂ MA. Let m be the first el-
ement (while-loop lines 7-14) that m /∈ MO . Since
m is maximal (bm is minimal by assumption), we have
1, . . . ,m − 1 ∈ MO and the corresponding set of win-
ning bids bMO = {b1, . . . , bm−1, b
′
m, b
′
m+1, . . . , b
′
|MO|
},
where the bids {b1, . . . , b′|MO|} are listed in the de-
scending order. Meanwhile, Algorithm 1 chooses bWA =
{b1, . . . , bm−1, bm, bm+1, . . . , b|MA|} and there must be bm >
b′j for all j ≥ m. In particular, we have bm > b
′
m. Hence, we
define bM∗
O
= bMO ∪{bm} \ {b
′
m} , i.e., we obtain bM∗O by
removing b′m and adding bm to bMO . Thus, the social welfare
of bW∗
O
is calculated as follows:
S(M∗O) = S(MO) +
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3q|M|
D
)
(bm − b
′
m).
As bm−b′m > 0, (a1−a2e
a3q|M|
D ) q
D
> 0 and |M∗O| = |MO|,
S(M∗O) is strictly larger than S(MO). This is in contradiction
to that MO is the optimal solution and thus proves the claim.
We apply Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism [37]
in the service price calculation. In lines 16-30, for each itera-
tion, we exclude one selected miner from the set of winners
and re-execute the winner selection process to calculate the
social cost of the miner as its payment. The VCG-based
payment function is defined as follows:
pi = S(MN\{i})− S(MN \ {i}), (17)
where S(MN\{i}) is the optimal social welfare obtained when
the selected miner i is excluded from the miner set N , and
S(MN \{i}) is the social welfare of the set of winners which
is obtained by removing miner i from the optimal winner set
selected from N .
Proposition 2. The CDB auction (Algorithm 1) is truthful.
Proof: Since the payment calculation in the algorithm
relies on the VCG mechanism, it directly satisfies the second
condition in Theorem 1 [31]. For the first condition about
monotonicity in Theorem 1, we need to show that if a winning
miner i raises its bid from bi to b
+
i where b
+
i > bi, it still stays
in the winner set. We denote the original winner set byM and
the new winner set by M+ after miner i changes its bid to
b+i . The original set of bids is b = {b1, . . . , bi, . . . , bN} (i ≤
|M|) sorted in the descending order. In addition, we define
S(bK) = S(K), ∀K ⊆ N which means the social welfare of
a set of bids is equal to that of the set of corresponding miners.
We discuss the monotonicity in two cases.
1) Case 1: bi−1 ≥ b
+
i ≥ bi ≥ bi+1. The new set of ordered
bids is b+ = {b1, . . . , bi−1, b
+
i , bi+1, . . . , bN}. We have
S({b1, . . . , b
+
i }) =
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3qi
D
)i−1∑
j=1
bj + b
+
i

− cqi
> S({b1, . . . , bi}) =
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3qi
D
) i∑
j=1
bj − cqi.
(18)
8The social welfare of the new set of bids {b1, . . . , b
+
i } is
larger than that of the original set of bids {b1, . . . , bi}, which
guarantees b+i being in the set of winning bids.
2) Case 2: bk−1 ≥ b
+
i ≥ bk ≥ · · · ≥ bi,
1 < k < i. The new set of ordered bids is b+ =
{b1, . . . , bk−1, b
+
i , bk, . . . , bi+1, . . . , bN}. We have
S({b1, . . . , bk−1, b
+
i }) =
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3qk
D
)k−1∑
j=1
bj + b
+
i


− cqk, (19)
S({b1, . . . , bk−1, bk}) =
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3qk
D
) k∑
j=1
bj − cqk,
(20)
S({b1, . . . , bk−1}) =
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3q(k−1)
D
) k−1∑
j=1
bj−cq(k−1).
(21)
As the coefficient q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3q|M|
D
)
in S(M) is a mono-
tonically decreasing function ofM, increasing bi may change
the set of winners M and reduce the number of winning
miners. However, the first i bids {b1, . . . , bk−1, bk, . . . , bi} in
the original set of bids b have already won the auction, so we
have S({b1, . . . , bk−1, bk}) > S({b1, . . . , bk−1}). From the
following inequation (22),
S({b1, . . . , bk−1, bk}) =
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3qk
D
)k−1∑
j=1
bj + bk


<
q
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3qk
D
)k−1∑
j=1
bj + b
+
i

 = S ({b1, . . . , bk−1, b+i })
(22)
the proof can be finally concluded by
S({b1, . . . , bk−1, b
+
i }) > S({b1, . . . , bk−1}), (23)
which implies that b+i still remains the bid of a winner in the
auction.
Proposition 3. The CDB auction (Algorithm 1) is computa-
tionally efficient and individually rational.
Proof: Sorting the bids has the complexity of
O(N logN). Since the number of winners is at most
min(D
q
, N), the time complexity of the winner selection
process (while-loop, lines 7-15) is O(min2(D
q
, N)). In each
iteration of the payment calculation process (lines 16-30), a
similar winner selection process is executed. Therefore, the
whole auction process can be performed in polynomial time
with the time complexity of O(min3(D
q
, N) +N logN).
According to Proposition 1 and the properties of the VCG
mechanism [37], the payment scheme in Algorithm 1 guaran-
tees the individual rationality.
V. AUCTION-BASED MECHANISMS FOR MULTI-DEMAND
MINERS
In this section, we investigate a more general scenario where
miners request multiple demands of cloud/fog computing
resources.
A. Social Welfare Maximization for the Blockchain Network
We first investigate the winner selection problem defined
in (9)-(11) from the perspective of an optimization problem.
Evidently, it is a nonlinear integer programming problem with
linear constraints, which is NP-hard to obtain the optimal
solution. Naturally, we can find an approximate method with
a lower bound guarantee. Similar to Section IV, the original
problem is rewritten as a subset function form:
max
M⊆N
S(M) =
∑
i∈M
di
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3
∑
i∈M di
D
)
bi
−c
∑
i∈M
di, (24)
s.t.
∑
i∈M
di ≤ D, (25)
where S(M) is the social welfare function of the selected set
of winners M and bi = v′i = (T + rsi) e
− 1
λ
ξsidi. This form
means that we can view it as a subset sum problem [38]. We
assume that there is at least one miner i such that S({i}) > 0.
Additionally, although the miners can submit demands that
they want instead of the same constant quantity of computing
resources, it is reasonable to assume that the CFP puts a
restriction on the purchase quantity, i.e., β1D < di ≤ β2D,
where β1D, β2D are respectively the lower and upper limit on
each miner’s demand, and 0 < β1 < β2 < 1 are predetermined
demand constraint ratios. Clearly, S(∅) = 0.
Definition 1. (Submodular Function [39]). Let X be a finite
set. A function f : 2X → R is submodular if
f(A ∪ {x})− f(A) ≥ f(B ∪ {x})− f(B), (26)
for any A ⊆ B ⊆ X and x ∈ X \ B, where R is the set of
reals. A useful equivalent definition is that f is submodular if
and only if the derived set-function
fx(A) = f(A ∪ {x})− f(A) (A ⊆ X \ {x}) (27)
is monotonically decreasing for all x ∈ X .
Proposition 4. The social welfare function S(M) in (24) is
submodular.
Proof: By Definition 1, we need to show that Su(M)
in (30) is monotonically decreasing, for every M ⊆ N and
u ∈ N \M. Let g(z) = a1 − a2e
a3
D
z , where z ∈ R+. Then,
the first derivative and second derivative of g(z) are expressed
respectively as follows:
dg(z)
dz
= −
a2a3
D
e
a3
D
z,
d2g(z)
dz2
= −
a2a
2
3
D2
e
a3
D
z. (31)
Because a2, a3, D > 0, we have −
a2a3
D
e
a3
D
z < 0 and
−a2a
2
3
D2
e
a3
D
z < 0, which indicates that g(z) is monotonically
decreasing and concave.
9Su(M) = S(M∪ {u})− S(M) (28)
=
∑
i∈M∪{u}
di
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3
∑
i∈M∪{u} di
D
)
bi −
∑
i∈M
di
D
(
a1 − a2e
a3
∑
i∈M di
D
)
bi − cdu (29)
=
((
a1 − a2e
a3
∑
i∈M∪{u} di
D
)
−
(
a1 − a2e
a3
∑
i∈M di
D
)) ∑
i∈M
dibi
D︸ ︷︷ ︸
➀
+
(
a1 − a2e
a3
∑
i∈M∪{u} di
D
)
dubu
D
− cdu︸ ︷︷ ︸
➁
(30)
Next, we discuss the monotonicity of Su(M) in (30).
Note that expanding M means increasing the total quan-
tity of allocated resources dM =
∑
i∈M di. Substituting
z = dM and z = dM∪{u} into g(z), we observe that
g(dM∪{u}) − g(dM) = g(
∑
i∈M∪{u} di) − g(
∑
i∈M di) =(
a1 − a2e
a3
D
∑
i∈M∪{u} di
)
−
(
a1 − a2e
a3
D
∑
i∈M di
)
< 0 is
decreasing and negative due to dM < dM∪{u} and the
monotonicity and concavity of g(z). Additionally, it is clear
that when M expands,
∑
i∈M dibi > 0 is positive and
increasing. Therefore, ➀ in (30) is proved to be monotonically
decreasing. Because g(z) is monotonically decreasing, it is
straightforward to see that ➁ in (30) is also monotonically
decreasing with the expansion ofM. Finally, we can conclude
that Su(M) is monotonically decreasing, thus proving the
submodularity of S(M).
It is worth noting that there is a constraint in (10), also called
a knapsack constraint. This constraint not only affects the
resulting social welfare and the number of the selected miners
in the auction, but also needs a careful auction mechanism
design to guarantee the truthfulness. Essentially, the optimiza-
tion problem appears to be a non-monotone submodular maxi-
mization with knapsack constraints. It is known that there is a
(0.2− η)-approximate algorithm which applies the fractional
relaxation and local search method [40, Figure 5]. η > 0 is a
preset constant parameter that specifies the approximation ratio
(0.2-η). For the ease of expression, we name this approximate
algorithm as FRLS algorithm. In general, the FRLS algorithm
first solves a linear relaxation of the original integer problem
using local search, and then it rounds the obtained fractional
solution to an integer value. However, the algorithm requires
the objective function to be non-negative. To address this issue,
let H(M) = S(M) + c
∑
i∈N di. Clearly, H(M) ≥ 0 for
any M ⊆ N and it remains submodular since c
∑
i∈N di is
a constant. Additionally, maximizing S(M) is equivalent to
maximizing H(M). Hence, we attempt to design the FRLS
auction which selects the winner based on the FRLS algorithm
and let service price pi = bi. As to the specific input to
the FRLS algorithm, it takes 1 as the number of knapsack
constraints, the normalized demand profile d
D
as its knapsack
weights parameter, η as the approximate degree, andH(M) as
the value oracle which allows querying for function values of
any given set. The FRLS auction is computationally efficient,
as the running time of the FRLS algorithm is polynomial [40].
Furthermore, miners just need to pay their submitted bids to
the CFP and cannot suffer deficit, so the FRLS auction also
satisfies the individual rationality requirement. However, we
find that FRLS auction cannot guarantee truthfulness. The
corresponding proof is omitted due to space constraints.
B. Multi-Demand miners in Blockchain networks (MDB) Auc-
tion
Although the FRLS auction is capable solving the social
welfare maximization problem approximately, it is not real-
istic to be directly applied in a real market since it cannot
prevent the manipulation of bids by bidders, i.e., lacking of
truthfulness. As mentioned before, we aim to design an auction
mechanism that not only achieves a good social welfare, but
also possesses the desired properties, including computational
efficiency, individual rationality and truthfulness. Therefore,
we present a novel auction mechanism for Multi-Demand min-
ers in Blockchain networks (MDB auction). In this auction, the
bidders are limited to be single-minded in the combinatorial
auctions. That is, we can assume safely that the mechanism
always allocates to the winner i exactly the di items that it
requested and never allocates anything to a losing bidder. The
design rationale of the MDB auction relies on Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. ([41]) In the multi-unit and single minded setting,
an auction mechanism is truthful if it satisfies the following
two properties:
1) Monotonicity: If a bidder i wins with bid (di, bi), then
it will also win with any bid which offers at least as
much price for at most as many items. That is, bidder
i will still win if the other bidders do not change their
bids and bidder i changes its bid to some (d′i, b
′
i) with
d′i ≤ di and b
′
i ≥ bi.
2) Critical payment: The payment of a winning bid (di, bi)
by bidder i is the smallest value needed in order to win
di items, i.e., the infimum of b
′
i such that (di, b
′
i) is still
a winning bid, when the other bidders do not change
their bids.
1) Auction design: Before presenting the MDB auction, we
first introduce the marginal social welfare density. It is the
density of miner i’s marginal social welfare contribution to
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Algorithm 2 MDB auction
Input: Miners’ demand profile d and bid profile b.
Output: Resource allocation x and service price profile p.
1: begin
2: for each i ∈ N do
3: xi ← 0, pi ← 0
4: end for
5: M← ∅, d← 0
6: while M 6= N do
7: j ← argmaxi∈N\M S
′
i(M)
8: if d + dj > D or S
′
j(M) < 0 then
9: break
10: end if
11: M←M∪ {j}
12: d← d + dj
13: end while
14: for each i ∈ M do
15: xi ← 1, N−i ← N \ {i}
16: T0 ← ∅, d
′ ← 0, k ← 0, Lp ← 0
17: while Tk 6= N−i do
18: ik+1 ← arg maxl∈N−i\Tk S
′
l(Tk)
19: b′ik+1
← arg
bi∈R
+ S
′
i(Tk) = S
′
ik+1
(Tk)
20: if d′ + dik+1 > D or S
′
ik+1
(Tk) < 0 then
21: break
22: else if d′ + dik+1 ≤ D − di then
23: Lp ← Lp + 1
24: end if
25: Tk+1 ← Tk ∪ {ik+1}, d
′ ← d′ + dik+1
26: k ← k + 1
27: end while
28: if S′iLp+1
(TLp) < 0 or diLp+1
> di then
29: S˜ ← 0
30: else
31: S˜ ← S′iLp+1
(TLp)
32: end if
33: b′iLp+1
← arg
bi∈R
+ S
′
i(TLp) = S˜
34: b′i ← mink∈{0,1,...,Lp+1} b
′
ik
35: pi ← (a1 − a2e
a3
∑
j∈M dj
D )
b′i
D
36: end for
37: end
the existing set of winners M, which is defined as follows:
S′i(M) =
Si(M)
di
=
S(M∪ {i})− S(M)
di
=
(
a2e
a3
∑
j∈M dj
D − a2e
a3
∑
j∈M∪{i} dj
D
)∑
j∈M djbj
Ddi︸ ︷︷ ︸
➀
+
(
a1 − a2e
a3
∑
j∈M∪{i} dj
D
)
bi
D
− c︸ ︷︷ ︸
➁
. (32)
For the sake of brevity, we simply call it density.
As illustrated in Algorithm 2, the MDB auction allocates
computing resources to miners in a greedy way. According to
the density, all miners are sorted in a non-increasing order:
S′1(M0) ≥ S
′
2(M1) ≥ · · · ≥ S
′
i(Mi−1) ≥ · · · ≥ S
′
N (MN−1).
(33)
The ith miner has the maximum density S′i(Mi−1) over
N \ Mi−1 where Mi−1 = {1, 2, . . . , i − 1} and M0 = ∅.
From the sorting, the MDB auction finds the set of win-
ners MLm containing Lm winners, such that dMLm ≤ D,
S′Lm(MLm−1) ≥ 0 and S
′
Lm+1
(MLm) < 0 (lines 6-13).
To determine the service price for each winner i ∈ MLm
(lines 14-36), the MDB auction re-executes the winner se-
lection process and similarly sorts other winners in N−i =
N \ {i} as follows:
S′i1(T0) ≥ S
′
i2
(T1) ≥ · · · ≥ S
′
ik
(Tk−1) ≥ · · · ≥ S
′
iN−1
(TN−2),
(34)
where Tk−1 denotes the first k− 1 winners in the sorting and
T0 = ∅. From the sorting, we select the first Lp winners where
the Lpth winner is the last one that satisfies S
′
iLp
(TLp−1) ≥ 0
and dTLp−1 ≤ D − di. Let S˜ denote the (Lp + 1)th winner’s
virtual density. If the (Lp+1)th winner has a negative density
on TLp , i.e., S
′
iLp+1
(TLp) < 0, or its demand is larger than that
of winner i, i.e., dLp+1 > di, we set S˜ = 0. Otherwise, S˜ =
S′iLp+1(TLp). Meanwhile, Algorithm 2 forms a price list L =
{S′i1(T0), . . . , S
′
iLp
(TLp−1), S˜} containing (Lp + 1) density
values. According to the list, we find the winner i’s minimum
bid b′i such that S
′
i(Tk−1) ≥ S
′
ik
(Tk−1), ∃k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Lp}
or S′i(TLp) ≥ S˜. Here, b
′
i is called miner i’s ex-ante price,
which is the payment without considering the allocative ex-
ternalities. Then, we set pi =
(
a1 − a2e
a3
∑
j∈MLm
dj
D
)
b′i
D
as
the winner i’s final payment.
2) Properties of MDB Auction: We show the computational
efficiency (Proposition 5), the individual rationality (Propo-
sition 6), and the truthfulness (Proposition 7) of the MDB
auction in the following.
Proposition 5. MDB auction is computationally efficient.
Proof: In Algorithm 2, finding the winner with the
maximum density has the time complexity of O(N) (line 7).
Since the number of winners is at mostN , the winner selection
process (the while-loop lines 6-13) has the time complexity of
O(N2). In the service price determination process (lines 14-
36), each for-loop executes similar steps as the while-loop in
lines 6-13. Hence, lines 14-36 have the time complexity of
O(N3) in general. Hence, the running time of Algorithm 2 is
dominated by the for-loop, which is bounded by polynomial
time O(N3).
Proposition 6. MDB auction is individually rational.
Proof: Let ii be the miner i’s replacement which appears
in the ith place in the sorting (34) over N−i. Since miner
ii would not be in the ith place if winner i is considered, we
have S′ii(Ti−1) ≤ S
′
i(Ti−1). Note that Algorithm 2 chooses the
minimum bid b′i for miner i, which means that given the bid b
′
i,
miner i’s new density S′′i (Ti−1) at least satisfies S
′′
i (Ti−1) ≤
S′ii(Ti−1) ≤ S
′
i(Ti−1). According to the definition of the den-
sity in (32), S′i(Ti−1) is a monotonically increasing function
of bi. Hence, we have bi − b
′
i ≥ 0 as S
′
i(Ti−1) ≥ S
′′
i (Ti−1).
Therefore, the final payment for miner i is not more than its ex-
post valuation, i.e., pi =
(
a1 − a2e
a3
∑
j∈MLm
dj
D
)
b′i
D
≤ v′′i =(
a1 − a2e
a3
∑
j∈MLm
dj
D
)
bi
D
. Thus, the individual rationality
of MDB auction is ensured.
Proposition 7. MDB auction is truthful.
Proof: Based on Theorem 2, it suffices to prove that the
selection rule of the MDB auction is monotone, and the ex-
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ante payment b′i is the critical value for winner i to win the
auction.
We first discuss the monotonicity of the MDB auction in
terms of winner i’s bid and demand subsequently. Recalling
the density S′i(M) in equation (32), it is clear that S
′
i(M)
is a monotonically increasing function of miner i’s bid bi.
As miner i takes the ith place in the sorting (33), when
winner i raises its bid from bi to b
+
i , it at least has a new
larger density S′
i+
(Ti−1) > S′i(Ti−1) ≥ 0. Because of the
submodularity of S(M), miner i can only have a larger density
when it is ranked higher in the sorting, i.e., S′
i+
(Mi−k) >
S′
i+
(Mi−1) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , i}. Therefore, miner i with
a higher bid can always win the auction. Similarly, when it
comes to miner i’s demand di, we only need to show that
S′i(M) is a monotonically decreasing function of di. Let
h(z) =
a4
(
1− e
a3
D
z
)
z
(35)
where z ∈ R+ and all parameters are positive. The first
derivative of h(z) is
dh(z)
dz
= −
a4(
a3
D
e
a3
D
zz + 1− e
a3
D
z)
z2
. (36)
Since the first derivative of (a3
D
e
a3
D
zz+1−e
a3
D
z) is
a23
D2
e
a3
D
zz >
0, we can have dh(z)dz < 0 with a3, a4, D, z > 0. Thus, h(z) is
monotonically decreasing with z. By substituting z = di, we
can easily observe that ➀ in (32) is a monotonically decreasing
function with respect to di. Finally, S
′
i(M) is proved to be
monotonically decreasing with di since ➁ in (32) is clearly a
monotonically decreasing function of di as well.
Next, we prove that b′i is the critical ex-ante payment. This
means that bidding lower b−i < b
′
i can lead to miner i’s failure
in the auction. Given that di is fixed, we note that b
′
i is the
minimum bid such that miner i’s new density S′′i (Tk) is no
more than any value in the kth place in the sorting (34),
where k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Lp − 1}. If miner i submits a lower
bid b−i , it must be ranked after the Lpth winner in (34)
due to submodularity of S(M). Then, its density has to be
compared with S˜. Considering the (Lp + 1)th winner in the
sorting (34), if its density S′iLp+1(TLp) ≥ 0 and diLp+1 ≤ di,
S˜ is set to be S′iLp+1(TLp). In this case, miner i with bid
b−i cannot take the (Lp + 1)th place as its new density is
S′′i (TLp) < S
′
i(TLp) ≤ S˜ = S
′
iLp+1
(TLp). Also, it no longer
can win the auction by taking the place after the (Lp + 1)th
because the remaining supply D − dTLp+1 cannot meet its
demand di, i.e., D − dTLp+1 < di. If S
′
iLp+1
(TLp) < 0 or
diLp+1 > di, S˜ is just set to be 0. Apparently, b
−
i is not a
winning bid as S′′i (TLp) < b
′
i = S˜ = 0.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
In this section, we first perform experiments to verify the
proposed hash power function and network effects function.
Then, from simulation results, we examine the performance
of the proposed auction mechanisms in social welfare maxi-
mization and provide useful decision making strategies for the
CFP and the blockchain developer.
A. Verification for Hash Power Function and Network Effects
Function
Similar to the experiments on mobile blockchain mining
in [10], [42], we design a mobile blockchain client application
in the Android platform and implement it on each of three
mobile devices (miners). The client application can not only
record the data generated by internal sensors or the transac-
tions of the mobile P2P data trading, but also allows each
mobile device to be connected to a computing server through
a network hub. The miners request the computing service from
the server. Then, the server allocates the computing resources
and starts mining the block for the miners. At the server side,
the each miner’s CPU utilization rate is managed and measured
by the Docker platform5. In our experiment, all mining tasks
(solving the PoW puzzle) are under Go-Ethereum6 blockchain
framework.
To verify the hash power function in (1), we vary the
service demand of one miner i in terms of CPU utilization,
i.e., di, while fixing the other two miners’ service demand at
40 and 60. Here, the total amount of computing resources is
dN = di + 40 + 60. Besides, we initially broadcast 10 same
transaction records to the miners in the network so that all
mined blocks have the same size. Figure 3a shows the change
of the hash power, i.e., the probability of successfully mining a
block with different amount of computing resources. We note
that the hash power function defined in (1) can well fit the
real experimental results.
To verify the network effects function in (5), we investigate
the capability of the blockchain to prevent the double-spending
attacks. We add a malicious miner with fixed computing
powers, i.e., an attacker performing double-spending attacks,
to the blockchain network. Then, we conduct several tests
by varying the CPU resources of the other miners, i.e., the
sum of existing honest miners’ computing resources dN , to
measure the probability of the successful attacks. Specifically
we count the number of fake blocks which successfully join
the chain every 10, 000 blocks generated in each test. Based
on the above results, we finally calculate the proportion of the
genuine blocks every 10, 000 blocks (i.e., each data point in
the Fig. 3b) as the security measure or the network effects
of the blockchain network. As illustrated in Fig. 3b, it is
evident that the network effects function in (5) also well fits
the real experiment results. Based on the experiments, we set
a1 = 1.97, a2 = 0.35, a3 = 1.02 in the following simulations.
B. Numerical Results
To demonstrate the performance of the proposed auction
mechanisms and the impacts of various parameters on the
social welfare of the blockchain network, we consider a set
of N miners, e.g., mobile users in a PoW-based blockchain
application supported by the CFP. Each miner’s block size is
uniformly distributed over (0, 1024]. Instead of being restricted
to submit a constant demand as in the CDB auction, each
miner in the MDB auction and FRLS auction can choose its
5 https://www.docker.com/community-edition.
6 https://ethereum.github.io/go-ethereum.
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Figure 3: Estimation of (a) the hash power function γ(di)
in (1) and (b) the network effects function w(pi) in (5).
desired demand which follows the uniform distribution over
[β1D, β2D]. Except Fig. 6a, each measurement is averaged
over 600 instances and the associated 95% confidence interval
is given. We can find that the confidence intervals are very
narrowly centered around the mean. The default parameter
values are presented in Table II. Note that setting q = 10,
β1 = 0 and β2 = 0.02 means the expected demand of miners
in the MDB auction is equal to the constant demand of miners
in the CDB auction. Hence, we can compare the performance
of both proposed auction mechanisms.
Table II: Default parameter values
Parameters Values Parameters Values
N 300 T 12.5
r 0.007 λ 15
c 0.001 q 10
a1 1.97 β1, β2 0, 0.02
a2 0.35 ξ 0.001
a3 1.02 D 1000
Table III: MDB auction versus FRLS auction in social welfare
maximization
Number of miners 10 15 20 25
MDB auction 33.954 50.368 65.421 80.135
FRLS auction 34.656 49.935 65.060 79.853
1) Evaluation of MDB auction versus FRLS auction in
terms of social welfare maximization: We evaluate the perfor-
mance of the MDB auction in maximizing the social welfare
by comparing it with the FRLS auction. Table III shows
the social welfare obtained by the MDB auction and the
FRLS auction. The social welfare generated from the MDB
auction is lower than that from the FRLS auction when dealing
with a small number of miners. As the group of interested
miners grows, the MDB auction can achieve slightly larger
social welfare although it has to preserve necessary economic
properties, including individual rationality and truthfulness.
The main reason is that the FRLS auction is an algorithm
which only provides a theoretical lower bound guarantee in the
worst case for approximately maximizing the social welfare,
and may have more severe performance deterioration when
interested miners become more.
Figure 4: Impact of the number of miners N .
2) Impact of the number of miners N : Besides the social
welfare, we introduce the satisfaction rate, i.e., the percentage
of winners selected from all interested miners, as another
metric. Here, we compare the social welfare as well as the
satisfaction rate of the CDB auction and the MDB auction with
various number of miners, as shown in Fig. 4. From Fig. 4, we
observe that the social welfare S in both auction mechanisms
increases as the base of interested miners becomes larger. We
observe that the satisfaction rate decreases and the rise of the
social welfare also slows down with the increase of N . The
main reason is that the competition among miners becomes
more obvious when more miners take part in the auction, and,
with more winners selected by the auction, the subsequent
winner’s density decreases due to the network effects. When
choosing between the CDB auction and the MDB auction,
Fig. 4 clearly shows that there is a tradeoff between the social
welfare and the satisfaction rate. The MDB auction can help
the CFP achieve more social welfare than the CDB auction
because of its advantage in relaxing restrictions on miners’
demand. However, the CDB is relatively more fair because
the MDB auction allows miners with large demand to take up
more computing resources and this leads to a lower satisfaction
rate.
3) Impact of the unit cost c, the fixed bonus T , the trans-
action fee rate r and the block time λ: The CFP organizes
the auction and cares about the unit cost of the computing
resource. It is obvious from Fig. 5 (a) that as the computing
resources become expensive, the social welfare in each auction
mechanism decreases linearly. The blockchain developer may
be more interested in optimizing the blockchain protocol
parameters, including the fixed reward, the transaction fee
rate and the block time. In Figs. 5(b)-(d), we study their
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Figure 5: Impact of unit cost c, fixed bonus T , transaction fee
rate r and block time λ.
impacts on the social welfare of the blockchain network.
Figures. 5(b) and 5(c) illustrate that if the blockchain developer
raises the fixed bonus T or the transaction fee rate r, higher
social welfare will be generated nearly in proportion. This
is because miner’s valuation increases with higher T and r,
according to the definition in (6). Moreover, by increasing
T and r, we observe that the difference of the social welfare
between the CDB auction and the MDB auction amplifies. The
reason is that raising T and r can significantly improve the
valuation of miner i which possesses large block size si and
high demand di. As shown in Fig. 5 (d), when the blockchain
developer raises the difficulty of mining a block, i.e., extending
the block time λ, the social welfare goes up. This is because a
long block time λ gives the miner which has solved the PoW
puzzle a higher probability to successfully propagate the new
block and reach consensus. However, different from adjusting
T and r, the marginal gains in social welfare gradually become
smaller if the blockchain developer continues to increase the
difficulty of the blockchain mining. This is mainly due to
that the increasing value of λ has less impact on the miner’s
valuation, as can be seen from the equations (4) and (6).
4) Miner’s utility and individual demand constraints in the
MDB auction: In the MDB auction, we randomly choose
a miner (ID=120) to see its utility which is defined by the
difference between its ex-post valuation and its payment, i.e.,
v′′120−p120. The miner’s block size is respectively at a low level
(s120 = 300) and a high level (s120 = 1000). We investigate
the impact of the miner’s true demand on its utility, which also
reflects the impact of its available budget. Fig. 6 (a) shows
that when miner 120’s true demand rises, its utility initially
stays at 0 and then suddenly increases. This indicates that
only when the miner’s demand is above a threshold, it can be
selected as the winner by the MDB auction, i.e., xi changes
immediately from 0 to 1, obtains the computing resources and
finally has a positive utility. Otherwise, the miner would not
be allocated the resources, i.e., xi = 0, and then both its ex-
post valuation and payment should be 0 according to the MDB
auction algorithm, which results in zero utility. Additionally,
if the miner’s generated block is larger, it can obtain higher
Figure 6: Relationship between miner i’s (i = 120) utility
and its true demand, and the impact of the degree of demand
dispersion θ.
utility with the same true demand. This implies that miners
with large block size and high demand are easier to be selected
by the MDB auction for social welfare maximization.
In Fig. 6 (b), we investigate the impact of the demand
constraints on the social welfare in the MDB auction. To fix
the miner’s expected demand at q, we set demand constraints
β1D = q− θD and β2D = q+ θD where θ ∈ [0,min(
q
D
, 1−
q
D
)] characterizes the degree of demand dispersion. It is
clear that social welfare increases as the degree of demand
dispersion rises and miners have more freedom to submit their
desired demands.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the cloud/fog computing
services that enable blockchain-based DApps. To efficiently
allocate computing resources, we have presented an auction-
based market model to study the social welfare optimization
and considered allocative externalities that particularly exist
in blockchain networks, including the competition among
the miners as well as the network effects of the total hash
power. For miners with constant demand, we have proposed
an auction mechanism (CDB auction) that achieves optimal
social welfare. For miners with multiple demands, we have
transformed the social welfare maximization problem to a
non-monotone submodular maximization with knapsack con-
straints problem. Then, we have designed two efficient mech-
anisms (FRLS auction and MDB auction) maximizing social
welfare approximately. We have proven that the proposed
CDB and MDB auction mechanisms are truthful, individually
rational and computationally efficient and are able to solve the
social welfare maximization problem.
In this work, we consider the energy and computational
constraints for PoW-based public blockchain network while
assuming an ideal communication environment. For practical
system implementation, the communication constraint is actu-
ally an important factor in establishing the mobile blockchain
network. An example is that the limited bandwidth for each
miner’s mutual wireless communication will not only affect
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each miner’s utility, but also have an adverse impact on the
block broadcasting process and the throughput of the whole
blockchain network. For the future work, we will take the
complicated communication environment into account, and
design new spectrum allocation algorithms for more efficient
and practical blockchain system.
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